Talk and Fight – The Taliban’s Evolving Media Campaign

Description

During their reign from 1996 to 2001 the Taliban banned pictures of human beings and even ani
mals from television screens and newspapers considering them as incompatible with Islam. Pic
tures of broken TV screens and videocassettes draped around lamppost in public places became
symbolic for the Taliban’s harsh interpretation of the religious scriptures. After their removal from
power and with their reconstitution as an insurgent movement under the leadership of the Amir al
Mumineen, Mullah Umar, the Taliban left behind their past qualms. The increasing spread of
Taliban propaganda videos that contained pictures of living images coincided with the growing
strength of the insurgency in 2005/2006. While the Taliban hampered Afghans from entering the
worldwide web during their rule they are now running their own website in five different languages
and updating them several times a day. Starting with an overview on the Taliban’s media activities
this article will explore recent shifts in the Taliban’s stance on central policy issues. The years 2011
and 2012 witnessed important developments with regard to the Taliban’s positions on negotia
tions that culminated in the first public confirmation of meetings between a Taliban delegate and
US officials in February 2012. This confirmation comes after years of statements that ruled out any
talks before all foreign troops have left Afghanistan unconditionally. While it is impossible to make
a definite judgement on the sincerity of the Taliban’s willingness to talk and negotiate, this paper
argues that the movement’s leadership took a considerable risk by confirming meetings with US
officials. This confirmation reveals that the Taliban must have been already in preliminary talks
with the ‘ruthless invaders’ while they were still denying any contact in their statements. The
Taliban are now on a difficult path to keep up a consistent line in their public appearance trying to
avoid losing more credibility among their followers by appearing too soft towards their enemy. On
the other hand hardening their public tone would back those voices in the international commu
nity that doubt the Taliban’s sincerity to talk and call for continued military action against them.
Recent statements, for example in reaction to the burning of copies of the Quran on a US base in
Afghanistan show the aforementioned dilemma. The Taliban first issued a rather muted statement,
but then, obviously adjusting to the violent protests in major Afghan cities, adopted a more radical
tone in a second statement.