The Majority Strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood

Description

Since it became clear in March 2011 that free general elections would be held in Egypt, a month after the fall of Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood has been bent on a “majority strategy”. This included a whole series of measures and developments, such as founding a political party, winning the general elections of November 2011 – January 2012, and the elections for the Majlis al-Shura elections of February 2012 and obtaining a dominant influence in the Constituent Assembly, which was appointed after the elections. But not
only did it mean winning the elections in these democratic bodies, it also meant obtaining control over professional organizations that would delegate representatives to the Constituent Assembly, such as trade unions, professional syndicates, and other organizations belonging to civil society. This trend has been accelerated since Muhammad Mursi has become president in June 2012. Using his executive powers he has increased the power of the Muslim Brotherhood by dismissing and appointing high officials. The sacking of General Hussein Tantawi in August 2012, and the downgrading of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) was of course the most spectacular move, but the appointment of governors, newspaper editors, and other media have been means of extending the power of the Muslim Brotherhood. The detractors of the Brotherhood accuse the organization of willfully grabbing power at the expense of the activists who brought the revolution of 25 January about. They argue that during the transition phase, which ended with the referendum on the constitution on 15 December 2012, the institutions of the state should represent “all currents and groups in Egypt”. Its defendants, on the other hand, argue that the Brotherhood has obtained a majority in parliament and then won the presidential elections and that movement therefore represents the “will of the people” (iradat al-sha‘b). The supporters of the previous regime are blocking the justified reforms that the Brotherhood is implementing in the name of the revolution. This contribution analyzes the ‘majority strategy’ of the Brotherhood and its inability to form coalitions (except with some sections of the Salafi movement) and break out of its isolation and appeal to a larger public. Does this stem from its previous history of persecution during the past 80 years and its suspicious nature as a semi-underground movement that has no experience in politics, or does it have its roots in the nature of the revolution which reached an impasse very early on and cannot be resolved without more heavy-handed measures? The contribution will include in its analysis the responses of other political players to the rise of the Brotherhood (Salafis, liberals, activists, split-offs of the Brotherhood, SCAF, judges, etc). It will also include an analysis of the way the Brotherhood looks at politics. Is it true that politics has become a separate field of activity that aims at finding solutions to concrete problems during the past thirty years, or is it simply an instrument to acquire power? The contribution is based on close (if intermittent) reading of Egyptian newspapers and weblogs over the past one and a half years.