Fragmentation in the Syrian Opposition

Description

The peaceful protests that erupted in the southern Syrian city of Dar‘a in March 2011 sparked a protracted protest movement that has now entered its second year. These uprisings have been met with fierce repression by the regime, which has until recently rejected all regional and national demands for a halt to the violence, instead offering cosmetic political reforms, for example, in the form
of a political parties law and a new constitution. Thus far, the regime has been able to shield itself from a more substantive political transition process in large part because of the absence of a unified Syrian opposition. Although the Syrian uprising has created the political opportunity for the formation of multiple Syrian opposition groups, they have, to date, been unsuccessful in uniting under
one common organizational framework. Rather, as the uprising continues, more and more groups claiming to represent the opposition have emerged, creating disunity, conflict, and mistrust between the different opposition groups. In this paper, I ask the following question: What are the factors behind fragmentation in the Syrian opposition? Here, I make three claims. First, the presence
of external and internal (inside/outside) opposition groups has impeded coordination among different political actors and the formation of a cohesive, organized framework for the mobilization of the opposition. The dynamics behind inside/outside divisions are complex, and include the lack of
trust between different political actors and the inability of external based groups, such as the Syrian National Council (SNC), to affect political change on-the-ground. Following this latter point, the second claim made here is that the lack of popular representation among the protestors has contributed to fragmentation. This has created a legitimacy deficit that has multiple implications both domestically and internationally. On the one hand, their lack of popular representation has allowed the regime to avoid including these groups in a political transition process. On the other hand, this deficit has also prevented the international community from providing its full political
and material support to the opposition. The legitimacy deficit is important to understanding fragmentation since it has discouraged opposition groups from centralizing their coordination. To some degree, the legitimacy deficit is a product of failed political strategies.
The final claim advanced here concerns the competing political strategies of opposition groups.
Opposition groups have been confronted with key strategic questions since the uprising began, including questions of violence or non-violence, negotiation with the regime or not, as well as whether to support military intervention. The political strategies adopted vis-à-vis these strategic questions have placed various opposition groups in tension with one another and have contributed
to their fragmentation. The most obvious example here is of groups that emerged, such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), to exercise violence against the regime. These groups have caused major splits with those, such as the Local Coordination Committee (LCC), who advocate non-violence.
Despite the political opportunity provided by the Syrian uprising, there remains no cohesive opposition. Rather, the opposition remains weak and fragmented. This fragmentation is reflected in the multiple splits between groups and the lack of coordination on key strategic issues. These divisions have negatively affected the possibilities for affecting political change in Syria and have
worked to shield the regime from demands for a political transition process.